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Tanjung Priok incident 
Many shot dead by troops 
Well over two dozen people were shot dead and many more 
wounded when troops fired on demonstrators in Tanjung Priok 
who were demanding that the police release four people. Tempo 
(22 September) put the number killed at 28, while the Petititon-
of-50 group in a statement (see below) said forty people died. 
The event which occurred on 12 September was the climax to 
a series of incidents provoked by local police and army security 
officers. On 7 September, a mubalig (preacher) had made a 
sermon at the Rawa Badak mosque denouncing government 
policy, in particular, according to Tempo, land seizures, the 
family planning programme and the Societies Law (see page 2) . 
Leaflets were circulated and anti-government slogans were 
painted. on walls. The local security officer (babinsa) later came 
to the mosque and ordered the slogans to be painted out. When 
this was refused, he soaked paper in filthy gutter water and used 
this to black out the slogans himself. He further incensed feelings 
by entering the mosque in his muddy boots (shoes must be 
removed). As the angry crowd swelled, the security officer made 
a hasty retreat. Later police arrived to arrest four people. 
The following Wednesday, a well-respected informal leader, 
Amir Biki, set up a street podium and spoke to a large crowd, 
repeating criticism of the government on a range of issues, and 
calling for the immediate release of the four detainees. After 
making this demand to the police later that evening by phone, a 
huge crowd gathered and marched to the police station. With the 
police beseiged, troop reinforcements arrived under helicopter 
cover. Eye-witnesses later described the scene that followed as 
resembling the scene of a battle. Troops shot at demonstrators; 
some according to Tempo were shot dead at close range. Among 
the first to fall was Amir Biki who had taken up a position in 
front of the crowd. 
Murdani takes control 
The very next morning, General Murdani, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces, summoned all editors in the capital and 
gave them his official version of the incident, making it clear that 
this was "first-hand information in accordance with the real 
incident". He admitted that troops had fired "in the direction of 
the mob" and that casualties were "inevitable". He claimed that 
there were nine deaths. His communique has been followed in 
the press by a wave of statements and resolutions praising him 
for acting with speed and decision so as to prevent "rumours and 
issues from spreading". There has not been a murmur of criti-
cism though some organisations, such as the Indonesian Council 
of Ulamas (MUI) have not yet made any statement: it says that it 
has been "too pre-occupied" with other things. 
Tanjung Priok is Jakarta's dockland where economic and social 
problems are serious: 
Economically, (it is) not the worst off but work is irregular and life 
insecure. The country's imports have been down dramatically, re-
ducing port employment , and recently the government has suddenly 
banned much stevedoring activity . .. There is also an ecological 
problem: fresh water is difficult and expensive to obtain in Tanjung 
Priok. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September 1984.) 
Many dockworkers and seamen in the area are from devout 
Muslim regions such as South Sulawesi, Madura and Banten, 
West Java. In the absence of channels for the expression of dis-
ur am eaving t e press conference soon after the 
Tanjung Priok incident, with Information Minister Harmoko 
(centre) and Major-General Try Soetrisno (right), Jakarta 
Military Commander. 
The fight for democra.cy 
content, people are turning increasingly to the mosque for lect-
ures and discussion . Some mubalig (preachers) are making no 
effort to conceal their feelings. Mosques are organised on a local 
basis under Dewan Dakwah and in some places , these Dewan 
(councils) appear to be promoting criticism. The FEER article 
quoted above refers to a "remaja (youth) mosque movement" , 
largely uncoordinated, which is spreading radical thoughts , now 
that many younger Muslims have turned away from the estab-
lished Muslim organisations that are subj ect to strong govern-
ment pressure. Many in this movement see "Pancasila-as-a-
single-principle" as a direct threat to religious freedom. Thus, 
the movement is not fundamentalist ; rather, it is concerned 
primarily with calling for democratic rights . 
Army leaders from Murdani down are deary extremely 
worried about the repercussions if the idea spreads that the 
Army is waging a campaign against Islam. The Army Chief-of-
Staff, General Rudini, on a visit to a pesantren (Muslim 
education centre) in East Java a week after the Tanjung Priok 
Amir Biki Amir Biki's Funeral 
incident said people "should avoid seeing the incident 
superficially which will create the impression that the Armed 
Forces are striking out against Islam ... "How can that be?" he 
said , "since I myself am a Muslim." Statements like that are not 
going to satisfy Muslims who fear the current drift of army 
policy. 
Petition-of-SO condemns Murdani 
A statement issued by the Petition-of-50 group and published 
only abroad (NRC Handelsblad , 21 September) strongly con-
demned , the ruthless crackdown on the Tanjung Priok 
demonstration and denounced Murdani for misleading the 
public. They called for an independent enquiry, and said that the 
crucial issue leading to the outburst is the lack of democracy and 
resentment against the Societies Law. One of their group is now 
in detention , Haji Fatwa, the Secretary; altogether twenty . 
people have been arrested, according to the group. Another 
familiar name among those arrested is Tony Ardie, the man who 
spoke out last year against the ban on schoolgirls wearing 
headscarves at school (see TAPOL bulletin No 61) . 
"Save Democracy" pamphlet 
attacks the Five Laws 
An illegal pamphlet entitled Save Democracy has been 
circulating in Indonesia since August. It accuses the Suharto 
regime of violating the Constitution and strongly attacks the Five 
Laws now before Parliament as the latest in its systematic 
campaign to render the Constitution meaningless. The 
publication, issued by the Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi 
(Institute for Constitutional Awareness) includes three articles., 
One is by Moh . Sanusi Hardjadinata of the Nationalist Party 
(PNI) and chairman of the government-enforced merger of 
nationalist and Christian parties, the POI, until he resigned in 
1980 over government interference in POI internal affairs; one is 
by Moh. Natsir , chairman of the Masyumi Party (Muslim) in the 
1950s; and one is by (retired) General Nasution. Thus the 
pamphlet includes the views of a "nationalist element", a 
"religious element" and an "Army" element (p.4) 
Although the media is not allowed to make any reference to 
the publication, it is known to have aroused a great deal of 
interest at a time when the Five Laws are shortly to h-.: enacted. 
The three writers · themselves in varying degret.s bear 
responsibility for the steady drift towards authoritarianism since 
the mid 1950s (parties of the left that were banned by the 
military in 1965 must also share some of that responsibility). 
The inclusion of an article by General Nasutio.n is intended to 
emphasise that army elements are part of the developing 
coalition to oppose the present ruling forces . This highlights, 
however, a critical flaw in the coalition as a force for the 
democracy since it acknowledges the role of the military (in the 
person of a retired general) in political and state affairs thus 
accepting the legitimacy of the dwi-fungsi (dual-function) of the 
Armed Forces , the principle that is the very essence of 
Indonesian militarism. Moreover, in his article, Nasution admits 
that it was under his leadership that the army in 1958 pressed for 
the restoration of the 1945 Constituion now in force a 
Constitution which provides the basis for authoritarianism. Well 
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may he attack (p.69) the present regime for enforcing a system of 
appointing Armed Forces representatives as members of 
Parliament, yet it was he who first insisted on this in 1958 as a 
member of President Sukarno's National Council, and it was 
under his pressure that Sukarno's reconstituted Parliament, set 
up in 1960 to replace the elected Parliament of 1955, included 35 
appointees from the Armed Forces as MPs. For these reasons, 
Nasution's contribution does not merit consideration as part of a 
document on saving democracy. 
* Sanusi Hardhadinata takes a look at the way the general 
elections held in 1971, 1977 and 1982 have been effectively 
manipulated by the regime, creating as a result a legislative body 
"that provides the cover for autocracy and oligarchy so that the 
political forces managing the state can give the impression of 
democracy" (p .21) . He accepts that "autocratic tendencies" 
displayed after the inception of Suharto's New Order in 1965 
were "understandable" thus placing himself on the side of the 
1965-6 massacres and the destruction of one whole section of 
political expression . His strong complaint is that, since 
conditions have "returned to normal", nothing has been done to 
restore democracy. He attacks the Five Laws for "perpetuating 
autocracy" or even leading to "totalitarianism" . Sanusi argues 
that as defined by Sukarno, Pancasila should only be the 
ideology of the state, not of the political parties. As Sanusi sees 
it, Pancasila as a state ideology must permit different ideologies 
to flourish (though not those ideologies that "threaten" 
Pancasila). The Societies Law and obligatory acceptance of 
Pancasila by all organisations is thus seen as the death-knell to a 
system of regulated political activity that he himself was part of 
until he resigned from the POI in 1980. 
* Moh. Natsir starts by stressing the contribution of 'Muslim 
followers' to the military takeover in 1965 when, he argues, "all 
groups, shoulder-to~shoulder, confronted the threat facing the 
state" . He goes on to prove his point by saying that "Colonel 
(now Lieutenant-General) Sarwo Edhie, then commander of the 
RPKAD (paracommandos) spoke about the spontaneous 
participation of all strata and groups while he was carrying out 
his heavy duties in Central and East Java1 and elsewhere". The 
late General Ali Murtopo, he continues, "did not hesitate to 
contact Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Muslim leader) to discuss 
recruiting Muslim youths to reinforce his intelligence apparatus 
in Central Java" (p.41). Thus he sees the years of violent 
political extermination as "our honeymoon period" with the 
New Order regime (p.42). 
But he goes on to describe the stage~by-stage regimentation 
of political life. First, the 1971 general elections secured a 
predominant position for the Armed Forces and its political 
party, GOLKAR. Then followed the forced merger of the seven 
political parties existing in 1973 after attempts to re-establish his 
own party, the Masyumi had been decisively rejected by 
Suharto. But at this stage, the two remaining parties were still 
permitted to advocate their own ideologies, though the Muslim 
Party PPP, was prohibited from using the word "Islam" in its 
name. 
Based on the proportional strengths of GOLKAR and the 
two non-government political parties in the present DPR and 
MPR, he points out that in future, 6002 out of the 1,000 seats in 
the MPR (the body which elects the president and lays down 






From GOLKAR and the 
2 other parties 
100 (from the DPR) 
100 
193 to 200 
100 
100 to 107 
600 
With some 250 DPR seats in GOLKAR hands (246 seats in the 
present DPR of 460 seats) GOLKAR and the Armed Forces will 
thus control 85 per cent of all MPR seats. 
The stage-by-stage attack on independent political parties 
went a step further with two speeches by Suharto in early 1980 
warning that political parties were displaying an unwillingness to 
accept Pancasila as their ideology. It was this that led a group of 
individuals to issue a statement of concern which subsequently 
came to be known as the "Petition-of-Fifty". Leaders of the five 
main religious councils (for the Protestants, the Catholics, the 
Muslims, the Hindus and the Buddhists) also met and issued a 
statement drawing attention to the right of these bodies and their 
respective social organisations to base themselves on their own 
religious beliefs. But even so, the MPR session adopted a policy 
decree in 1982 requiring all parties, organisations and groupings 
to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological basis. The Societies 
Law as now drafted, writes Natsir, is the realisation of our very 
worst fears . 
He finally complains bitterly about the total absence of social 
control, the heavy hand of press censorship, the "hot-line" 
linking the army's security force, Kopkamtib, and the 
Information Ministry with all editors telling them what they may 
and may not publish, and the constant surveillance of sermons in 
the mosques . "The farther one goes from the capital, the greater 
is the fear to express opinions ." (p.57) . 
Footnotes 
1. The massacres were the most severe in these two provinces . 
2. Parliament (DPR) will consist of 400 elected members and 100 
Armed Forces appointees . All DPR members sit in the MPR, plus 500 
appointees as itemised in this table. 
---------THE FIVE LAWS--------. 
Since the end of August, the Indonesian Parliament has 
been discussing a package of Five Draft Laws concerning: 
1. The political parties and GOLKAR. 
2. The general elections. 
3. The composition and status of Parliament (DPR) , 
the Upper Chamber (MPR), and the Regional 
Assemblies (DPRD) . 
4. Societies . 
5. A referendum. 
The first two are little more than amendments to 
existing laws, further tightening government control. The 
third law increases the seats in the DPR to 500 and in the 
MPR to 1,000. The Societies Law introduces a whole new 
range of restrictions on all social organisations, including 
the requirement that they adopt Pancasila as their sole 
ideology (see TAPOL Bulletin No 64, July 1984). The fifth 
law stipulates that any amendment to the country's 
Constitution may only be adopted by means of a 
referendum, the intention being to rule out any chance of 
the Constitution ever being amended, even though the 
composition of the legislative bodies already makes that 
certain . 
The contents of all these laws have been widely 
publicised since drafts were reproduced by two Jakarta 
dailies in June. Although there is evidence of much 
disquiet, none of this has found expression in the press, 
except for cautious statements made by leading Protestant 
and Catholic figures in Sinar Harapan (18 June). No one 
doubts that the Laws will be passed by acclamation. The 
PPP, the only party that might have made a last-ditch 
effort to resist some of the more devastating features of 
the laws, has been completely paralysed as the result of 
John Naro's coup de grace (see item on page 4). 
The Five Laws take the military regime yet a step 
further forward, effectively completing its stranglehold on 
political activity and eliminating the last remaining 
semblances of democratic rights . Perhaps the most 
important repercussion will be the shattering of any 
remaining illusions that the organisational structures set 
up by the military since the late 1960s can be used to press 
for the restoration of democracy. 
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PPP abandons Islam 
The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party) 
which came into being in 1973 as the result of a government-
enforced merger of the four Muslim parties existing at the time 
has now completely abandoned its Islamic principles . The PPP 
Congress held in August adopted the Pancasila as its sole belief. 
This conforms with government-dictated policy, soon to be 
enacted in the Societies' Law (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 64, July 
1984), that all organisations and parties are required to have no 
other ideology than Pancasila. The PPP now describes itself as 
an "open party" which means that Muslim and non-Muslim alike 
can join . 
The August Congress, the first ever to be held in the PPP's 
history, was orchestrated and controlled by John Naro, the man 
now in undisputed control of the party's leading organs. 
Formerly a public prosecutor believed to have had connections 
with the underworld, Naro became part of General Ali 
Murtopo's "special operations" unit (OPSUS), and played an 
active role in Parmusi, the Muslim party set up in the late 1960s 
after the Suharto regime had refused to permit Masjumi, the 
party outlawed by President Sukarno, to re-establish itself. 
The methods used by Naro to manipulate the Congress at will 
have been widely reported in the Indonesian press and can only 
anger Muslims who until now have regarded the PPP as a vehicle 
for Muslim aspirations. "It was," writes Tempo (25 August, 
1984), "Naro's Congress . He had everything tied up. From the 
moment he met President Suharto on 14 June and announced 
afterwards that the President would address the opening session 
of the Congress, it was clear that he was in control and had the 
President's blessing." Sinar Harapan (11 September 1984) also 
stresses that Naro stage-managed the Congress with government 
support and legitimisation. 
Naro's efforts to turn the PPP into a party completely 
supportive of the military regime became apparent in 1982 when 
he succeeded in removing government critics from the PPP 
electoral list in preparation for the 1982 general elections. His 
campaign was mainly directed against some leaders of the 
Nahdlatul Ulama, the ulama's party which has wide support 
particularly in East Java, and some of whose members have been 
vocal in their criticism of government policy. As a result of these 
machinations, Tempo reports, 76 of the 96 PPP members now in 
Parliament are Naro's men. People loyal to him also occupy 24 
out of the 37 seats on the party's Central Board. 
Congress delegates handpicked 
Many delegates to the Congress who had been appointed by 
their regional branches were refused entry to the hotel where the 
meeting was held. Tempo reports that more than a hundred NU 
delegates were kept out, and went to NU headquarters in 
Jakarta to complain. Sinar Harapan reported that people who 
were known to be unwilling to follow the Naro line were only 
invited to attend the opening and closing formal sessions and 
In session. The PPP Congress told to ''fortify the Pancasila". 
refused entry to sessions where de,cisions were taken. One PPP 
Central Board leader told Tempo quite bluntly that it was up to 
the Central Board to select delegates to represent the regions. 
The hotel used as the venue of the Congress is the location of 
one of the most notorious night clubs in Jakarta, a choice deeply 
offensive to orthodox Muslims. 
Hav41g packed the Congress with his followers, Naro then 
treated them with contempt. At the first working session, he 
simply presented a short summary of his report, copies of which 
were not distributed until the next day. As soon as he had 
finished speaking, his report was accepted by acclamation on a 
proposal from the platform, and it was then decided that no 
further discussion was needed . When "election" time came, 
Naro was proposed and "elected" unopposed, and appointed as 
the sole formateur with powers to appoint all the members of the 
Central Board. 
Far-reaching consequences 
The elimination of the PPP as a Muslim party could have far-
reaching political repercussions. Until the Naro coup, the PPP 
could never, it is true, hope to win a majority in parliament or 
play an effective role in national or local government because 
electoral processes and legislative bodies are rigged in the 
government's favour; but it was nevertheless a vehicle for 
Muslim views and enjoyed support from a considerable section 
of Muslims. During past general election campaigns, the PPP has 
always been able to organise well-attended rallies; at the 1982 
elections, these rallies were the occasion for pronounced 
condemnation of the army's party, GOLKAR, and of 
government policy. Naro's takeover has put an end to any 
illusions among Muslims of its relevance and its value as a 
political vehicle. One respected NU leader, Abdulrahman 
Wahid, h.as warned that "if there is no longer an outlet for 
Muslim aspirations, Muslim groups could go underground". 
(Tempo, 25 August) 
The well-known singer, Rhoma Irama, whose pop group 
performed extensively at PPP election rallies during the 1982 
elections, has publicly withdrawn his support for the party. 
"They have no claim any more to represent Muslim aspirations," 
he said. He foresaw that Muslims would become apathetic about 
political activity, and "could turn to unconstitutional means. 
And if that happens, it won't be the fault of the Muslims. The 
regulation of political life in this country has closed the door for 
Muslims to engage in constitutional activity." (Tempo, 25 
August) 
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West Papuan refugees 
Forced repatriation lllust be prevented 
The fate of thousands of West Papuan refugees now staying in 
many locations all along the PNG side of the border with 
Indonesia still hangs in the balance . While the Papua New 
Guinea government appears to be doing everything possible to 
delay repatriation, the Indonesian authorities are ma~ing all 
preparations for repatriation to proceed before the end of 
September. The following is a summary, for the record, of 
developments since the beginning of August: 
* In early August, PNG government spokesmen were 
reported in the PNG press as saying that "the repatriation of 
9,000 border-crossers" would commence "in a few weeks". This 
led to condemnation in the PNG press, protests from students 
and other groups and a statement by the PNG Red Cross (Post 
Courier, 6 August) insisting that the UNHCR, the Red Cross 
and other agencies must be involved "in the solution of the 
complex and difficult issue". Ten days later, a group of lawyers 
in PNG, in a closely argued statement, declared categorically 
that the repatriation which appeared to be being planned by 
PNG and Indonesia would be in violation both of PNG's own 
Constittttion and of international law (PNG Times, 16 August) . 
* A week later, the Deputy Governor of Indonesia's province 
of Irian Jaya, Brigadier-General Sugiyono announced (Sinar 
Harapan, 25 August) that agreement had been reached in 
negotiations between teams from the two sides in Port Moresby 
that repatriation of the refugees would commence on 17 
September. He said that Indonesian officials would go to the 
camps where the refugees are now situated to "hold dialogue" 
with the people and compile their personal data. 
* Meanwhile, in a move that clearly contradicted any such 
agreement, the PNG government reversed its position regarding 
involvement of the UN High Commission for Refugees which 
until then had only been allowed access to Vanimo camp which 
accommodates refugees who are recognised by all sides as not 
being eligible for any kind of repatration. The UNHCR was now 
being given access to all refugees camps. This reversal was 
almost certainly prompted by the news that 51 refugees had died 
at Komopkin up to mid-August; the figure soon rose to 97 (see 
box). Whether access would be confined to welfare work only or 
would also involve allowing the UNHCR to undertake 
protection activities has not, to TAPOL's knowledge, been 
officially clarified, though from UNHCR circles, T APOL 
understands that access must, as far as the agency is concerned, 
involve all aspects of its work. 
* Then in an article in the Guardian (7 September), Sydney-
based journalist Robin Osborne wrote that the thousands of 
refugees had been told that they must start returning home on 17 
September. He wrote: 
Requests that Indonesia permit outside monitoring have been turned 
down. Port Moresby has said that its own army will help in the 
operation, but many refugees have vowed they will not co-operate. 
Osborne hinted strongly however that the Michael Somare 
government was divided on the issue for he wrote that if, when 
faced with compulsory repatriation, "refugees decided to run for 
the hills, most of Mr Michael Somare's ministers could do 
likewise, leaving the man Indonesia calls its 'good and sensible 
friend' isolated". 
* From organisations in the UK and Denmark, including 
Survival International, the Anti-Slavery Society, the chairman of 
the Parliamentary Human Rights Group and T APOL in London 
and the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs in 
Cop.enhagen, cables were sent urging the Somare government 
not to proceed with any forced repatriation and to allow the 
UNHCR to determine their status as refugees. 
* Since then, the PNG government, aware of the strength of 
domestic and international concern, appears to be moving 
towards a position of avoiding any enforced repatriation. The 
government has apparently not denied that agreement was 
reached with Indonesia on repatriation though it has denied that 
a date was set (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September). It would 
seem to be relying on delaying tactics, insisting that firm 
guarantees must first be forthcoming from Indonesia before any 
repatriation can go ahead. The problem with such guarantees is 
that whether or not the PNG government regards them as 
reliable, the refugees themselves are hardly likely to accept any 
guarantees from the very authorities which have been harassing 
them for years. 
ICJ mission visits border 
* A six-man mission of the Australian International 
Commission of Jurists meanwhile visited all border camps in the 
first week of September. It was led by John Dowd, shadow 
Attorney-General, and included Father Bert Vandeberg of the 
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights who has spent 30 years in 
West Papua. The mission's full report will not be available in 
time for coverage in this issue, but an AAP/Reuters report from 
Port Moresby (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September) quotes 
the mission as reaching the conclusion that "the refugees were 
--Refugees die of starvation--
A total of 96 West Papuan refugees died of starvation in 
the southern border province of Papua New Guinea up to 
the end of August (West Australian, 30 August). The 
deaths have occurred mainly in Komopkin, a remote area 
not far from the border with Indonesia, as well as at 
nearby refugee camps in Bankin and Kungim. 
The influx of refugees has been so great that, although 
local villagers gave all the help they could, it was far from 
adequate . Government supplies dropped twice in the early 
period quickly dried up and were not replenished. 
Komopkin normally supports a population of 150 but now 
has to cope with more than 2000 people . 
Australian Associated Press journalist Chris Pash 
reported (The Age, 24 August) that many of the refugees 
were in a state of severe malnutrition already when they 
arrived. Some had trekked from up to 50 kilometres inside 
the border; 18 had died during the month after the first 
refugees arrived in April. 
The scandal of the high death rate first became public 
in Papua New Guinea when Member of Parliament 
Warren Dutton told the press that his first reports about 
the danger of death from starvation had not been heeded. 
A sizeable influx of relief funds from international 
agencies and from the UNHCR since August has helped 
improve food and medical supplies in the stricken areas. In 
an attempt to cope more effectively with the refugees' 
welfare, the PNG government decided earlier this year to 
transfer the issue from the hands of the Border Liaison 
Committee of the Foreign Affairs Department to the 
Department of Provincial Affairs. 
almost unanimous in that they would not agree to be voluntarily 
repatriated". A member of the mission, David Bitel said 
however that "September 17 is firmly fixed in their minds and 
they think they have to go". 
Special locations being built, say Indonesians 
* Meanwhile, reports in the Indonesian press persist in 
creating the impression that repatriation of all the refugees 
T APOL Bulletin No. 65. September 1984 5 
West Papuan refugees 
(excluding those in Vanimo) will commence imminently. Special 
locations have been set up in ten places along the border, 
according to Tempo (8 September) ; each one consists of 
complexes with dozens of barracks to accommodate the 
returning refugees. This strengthens the impression that the 
Indonesian military authorities intend to locate all refugees who 
are returned in encampments that would make it easy for the 
troops to maintain tight control over their future movements . 
This follows the style of population control already implemented 
in East Timar. The officer responsible for the operation in West 
Papua, the provincial Deputy-Governor, Brigadier-General 
Sugiono has seen service as a para-commando officer during the 
war in that country . 
* With regard to repatriation plans, the Indonesians have 
recognised since early September that the 17 September 
deadline will not be kept, and are now claiming that repatriation 
will commence before the end of September. Their explanation 
for the postponement is that , in view of demands from PNG for a 
written guarantee regarding the refugees' safety, Foreign 
Minister Mochtar has now agreed to provide written safeguards . 
The delay over the question of the guarantee, according to 
Jakarta, meant that a second round of negotiations between 
teams of the two sides that were to have taken place on 1 
September had to be postponed. However the issue appears to 
be far from being solved in Indonesia's favour because, 
according to Michael Richardson, writing in the Sydney Morning 
Herald (11 September), the PNG government is now seeking 
additional arrangements to "include the right of special access to 
Irian Jaya by the UNHCR or officials from PNG's embassy in 
Jakarta". 
Although the signs at the moment are that repatriation from 
PNG is unlikely, it is also clear that pressure has helped to bring 
this about. The signs from Jakarta are that the Indonesian 
military have no intention of letting the matter rest there . Under 
such circumstances, PNG will need all the support it can get to 
withstand further pressure from Indonesia and to cope with the 
consequence if it succeeds in withstanding Indonesian pressure. 
Over half the border people have 
left for PNG 
A group of representatives from church agencies in Papua New 
Guinea and Australia who visited the three main refugee centres 
in the West Sepik Province of PNG at the end of July believe 
that the 9 ,000 or more bush people who have crossed over into 
PNG in the last six months (excluding the one thousand or so 
being accommodated in Vanimo) account for about half the 
Melanesians living near the Indonesian side of the border. 
The group consisted of representatives from the Melanesian 
Council of Churches, World Christian Action (the aid body of 
the Australian Council of Churches), the PNG Catholic 
Commission for Justice , Development and Peace , Australian 
Catholic Relief and the Jesuit Refugee Service based in 
Melbourne. 
Their report dealt at length with relief needs in the camps, 
and also included a summary of what they learnt from interviews 
with the refugees: 
* This is not a sudden or isolated crisis; people have been 
experiencing harassment for some years . 
* They crossed the border not only out of fear, but many are 
aware that their movement is a statement, to tell the people 
of PNG and other countries of their plight. The OPM people 
among the refugees interpret the movement as a desire for 
independence. 
* Though there are disturbances in other parts of Irian Jaya, it 
is difficult to imagine that people will come across the border 
from inland villages more than a few days' walk from the 
border. 
* They were told many instances of harassment by the 
Indonesian authorities, all of which sounded credible . Some 
refugees had not had personal experience of harassment but 
related stories from others . 
* Though the transmigration programme is feared by many 
border people , only those from villages near the coast have 
had direct experience of it. 
* At the camps in Green River and Kamberatoro, there appear 
to be more men ; but they have mostly come in family units, so 
there are also a large number of children . None of the 
refugees appears to be older than 50 years. The really old 
people have chosen not to come, preferring to build isolated 
huts and stay behind on their land. Refugees were concerned 
that many of these old people may already be dead . 
500 more cross over 
Another 500 West Papuan refugees crossed over into PNG in 
mid-September , according to government officials in Port 
Moresby. They are now in Kugo village, west of the Ok Tedi 
mining township of Tabubil , in the central mountainous region 
of the border. PNG government officials say they do not know 
the reasons for this latest influx. (Post Courier , 14 September 
1984.) 
SECOND EDITION OUT NOW! 
TAPOL's book on West Papua was sold out within a year of 
publication. With demand for the book still strong, a second 
edition has been published, expanded to include an extra chapter 
giving an account of developments in West Papua since the 
beginning of this year. 
Order your copy now! 
Price: £3.00 plus postage 
(50 pence for the UK or seamail; £2.00 for airmail.) 
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''We fear for our lives'' 
The following is a personalised account of the circumstances of some of the West Papuan refugees who were interviewed by members of 
church relief and refugee agencies who visited refugee camps in West Sepik province of Papua New Guinea from 27 July to 1 August. 
Jacob is in his late thirties, married, with 
four children. He comes from Jayapura 
District but 100 km inland in the lower 
highlands area. In better times, he would 
be happily exercising the role of village 
councillor, the office he holds. Responsi-
bility for leadership has led him to a grave 
decision, however: to lead his people away 
from their traditional land across the bor-
der. The journey to the relative safety of 
PNG soil took just on a week. It had to be 
done secretly, the people scavenging for 
food along the way. The most immediate 
task was to avoid being discovered by the 
Indonesian soldiers searching for them. 
Platoons of RPKD commandos are also in 
the area right along the border - these are 
the "red beret" specialists. The jungle is in-
credibly dense and sufficient to assist such 
secret movements, however, and so they 
were not discovered. 
Why would someone like Jacob put 
himself and his people into such danger, 
and why would any Melanesian leave his 
land, his "pies bilong tumbuna"? Jacob 
says there are two basic reasons. Firstly, 
they are scared for their welfare at home 
because of the increased Indonesian milit-
ary presence. Secondly, they feel power-
less to protect their cultural identity and 
traditional way of life against the Indone-
sian "colonisation", a process which has 
been brutal and humiliating. Jacob says 
that they want the world to know what the 
situation is. 
-· ' For Jacob's people, the hard times 
began in 1977 when military personnel 
started to move into the area. The tragedy 
which marked itself into their history at 
that time was the arbitrary killi~ of one of 
the teachers. At this time, many of the 
people fled the village in fear to hide in the 
bush for weeks. Whey they eventually re-
turned, they were continually harassed by 
the soldiers and this has continued up till 
now. 
The harassment has taken the form of 
soldiers raiding the gardens, standing over 
the people for goods, ridiculing their cul-
ture, treating them as lesser beings. The 
bush telegraph continually brings in stories 
of atrocities committed against the 
Melanesian people in other parts of Irian 
Jaya: stories of brutal murders, mutilation, 
rape, church desecration, house burnings, 
disappearance of people, shootings of 
teenagers who dared to draw a Free West 
Papua Flag in the sand; news of the trans-
migration policy of the Indonesian govern-
ment in which some 900,000, mainly Mus-
lim Javanese, are to be moved into Irian 
Jaya in the next six years. No wonder the 
simple villagers lived in a state of fear for 
themselves and their heritage. 
Even so, Jacob and his people could 
consider no alternative to coming to terms 
with the Indonesian presence in their area. 
They could not consider themselves "In-
donesian" but maybe some form of accom-
modation was possible. So they went about 
their. daily lives, held down service jobs and 
tried to live peacefully even within the gen-
eral atmosphere of oppression. They .re-
ceived from time to time visits from OPM 
officials urging them to some form of resis-
tance, but the urgings were ignored . (The 
OPM is the name given to the movement, 
both military and political, struggling for 
the complete independence of Irian Jaya .) 
February 1984 changed the whole scene 
for them. The OPM tried to attack Jayap-
ura, relying on large-scale defections of 
West Irianese from the armed services. It 
never really got off the ground but a more 
open conflict had started, the worst since 
1978. Many educated West Irianese fled 
the capital and escaped into PNG which is 
only a matter of hours away by canoe. 
House-to-house searches began, every 
temporary absence being questioned. Dis-
appearances of. people became common. 
Leaders such as Arnold Ap, were arrested 
and in the worst cases executed. News of 
this spread quickly throughout the pro-
vince. The military became tense and har-
der to conciliate at local level. 
Then came the Yurup incident in which 
the OPM attacked a plane after it had 
landed and captured all those on board . 
They shot the two Indonesian passengers 
and kidnapped the Swiss mission pilot. 
This was not a planned event but soon 
some of the shrewder heads of the OPM 
were talking terms of release: K 1.5 million 
ransom, and that the "Irian Jaya issue" 
shourd be raised at the United Nations. In 
the end, the pilot's release was successfully 
negotiated but the people of the area now 
lived in heightened fear, for the fighting 
had come home to them. 
Retaliation was quick in coming with in-
creased patrols, small-scale fighting bet-
ween OPM and the Indonesian soldiers, 
continuous questioning. And so, the 
momentous decision to leave: to leave 
their homes, their livelihoods, their land; 
to leave the old eo1:>le who chose to re-
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main, some in their homes, some in the 
bush gardens. 
Jacob is a man of considerable dignity. 
He is grateful for the respite now being 
provided for him and his people but the 
question of "what next?" hangs over the 
camp like the grey clouds present daily. 
Their present safety and well-being de-
pends on the bonds of Melanesian brother-
hood which the people of PNG have ex-
pressed. They want to return home when it 
is safe, but "safety" is a relative term in the 
Irian Jayan context. Ultimately, the people 
want merdeka - freedom in their own 
land, and then they will truly be safe. Will 
they accept some verbal assurance from 
the Indonesian government that they will 
not suffer if they . return? Regrettably, the 
answer is "No" and hence the waiting and 
the praying. 
Now that the PNG government has ag-
reed to "escort" illegal border crossers like 
Jacob back into Irian Jaya, all their fears 
have returned. Did they do the right thing 
in coming? Will they suffer on their return, 
not immediately, but as time goes by? 
What does the long term future hold for 
them and their children? 
The same story is told by David, a Un-
ited Church pastor, although he and his 
family had been in the bush for three and a 
half years in hiding before crossing the bor-
der. They fled after witnessing atrocities at 
home. In fact, many of the people who 
have crossed have been wandering for 
years, fearful of returning to their homes. 
Otto is a university graduate in his mid-
twenties. He was an active member of one 
of the pro-Melanesian cells in Jayapura. 
He witnessed the "disappearance" of col-
leagues and fled when it was clear that the 
Indonesian security was checking on him. 
Paul, a simple fisherman, assisted them to 
escape and so he and his family are now in 
PNG afraid to return home. For David and 
Otto, the future seems to be political 
asylum in PNG or elsewhere. They are all 
waiting ... 
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West Papuan refugees 
Bishop of V animo talks about the 
refugees 
Bishop John Etheridge, Bishop of Vanimo, (West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea) , gave this interview on 31July1984 during a 
visit to Vanimo by the representative of the Jesuit Refugee Service, Australia: 
People have been crossing the border between PNG and Irian 
Jaya Indonesia before. How does the movement of people in 
recent months compare with the border crossings in previous 
years? 
This is the greatest number that I have experienced since I've 
been here . It i~ estimated that there are now about 10,000 West 
Irian people here in Papua New Guinea . A number of years ago, 
about 1977-'78, we had about 3,000 people who came across the 
border but this would the greatest amount we've had. 
Are they the same sort of people as came that time? 
Those 900 or so in the Kamberatoro area have left many 
villages within two main areas. In Green River where we have 
about 500 people, they have come from 3 or 5 villages, I 
understand. So in all the people come from quite a number of 
villages. 
What state are the refugees in when they arrive? What is their 
physical and psychological condition? What care do they need? 
One can say they fled, they are concerned, though they are 
not terrified. They are poor, often sick, and very malourished. 
There is not a great difference in physical condition between the 
border refugees and our own border people , except that amongst 
the refugees there is more sickness. Some have ulcers that they 
have had for 6 or 8 months which you won't find here because 
our people have medical treatment available. But most of those 
people have not had medical treatment for a long time. They are 
malnourished, but in that not markedly different from our own 
people. 
You will notice a difference in the people in the Vanimo 
camp. They are physically better than the bush refugees. But 
that is generally true for coastal people. 
What previous contact have the refugees had with the Church? 
Most of the people who have come across are Christians and 
the majority are Catholics . All have had contact with the 
churches. Their spirituality is ·very much the same as the Papua 
New Guinea people at the border. 
The Catholics are at home in our church, though we don't 
know their language. The Protestants in Black Water have 2 or 3 
pastors of their church among them. They have their own service 
on Sunday. It is well organised. I send a priest out for the 
Catoholics every Sunday. The last time when 700 people came 
there was not a single Catholic (nor were they all) Christians. 
Then a group came through to the Bewani area last year who 
were mainly Catholics. 
Do the refugees manage their own community life? 
The people are well disciplined and organised among 
themselves, there are leaders chosen and jobs assigned. They are 
not just here and being fed . At Kamberatoro they do work for 
the local community. Education-wise they are at a higher level 
than our local border people. 
What help is being provided for them? 
Here in the Vanimo camp they are taken to a quarantine 
camp for 3 weeks and given medical treatment and so on. After 
that they are taken to the Black Water camp where they are 
establishing themselves with bush houses and tents, and they are 
looked after with food. The United Nations finances the feeding 
and other attention in the Black Water camp. 
In the bush area at Kamberatoro where there are 8~900 
refugees the mission is looking after them completely with food, 
clothing, shelter and so on. For medical care I have two nurses 
working there with the refugees full-time. 
The group at Green River, where there are 500 or so are not 
as well off as those at Vanimo or Kamberatoro . They were being 
fed, this was started through Foreign Affairs, but now it looks 
like the mission will be taking this up and making sure they are 
fed. 
I know very little about what is going on down in the Western 
Province . It seems hard to get information, but I would think the 
Secretary of the Bishops' development committee can get that. I 
am assured they are being looked after to some degree. 
How have the people received these refugees? 
Very, very well. Many, both in the Black Water camp and out 
in the bush are related to some degree. The people have 
accepted them very well. They would like to be involved more. 
They would like to be able to go out and see them, take food out 
to them. 
I gather you've been able to speak with quite a few of them. What 
are the main reasons they give for coming? 
The reason they give is that they are afraid of the Indonesian 
soldiers. They are afraid of being harassed in their villages. 
There have been a number of skirmishes and incidents between 
the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka "Free Papua Movement") 
and the Indonesian soldiers in the area of the border. And these 
people tell me they are running away because of the reprisals 
against them for what the OPM has and is doing against the 
Indonesian government there. But I also believe that the OPM 
themselves have told the people to move out. So I think that is 
another reason as well as their running away from the 
harassment of the Indonesian soldiers. 
I believe they are running away in fear. They are afraid to 
stay in their villages while the Indonesian soldiers are in the area. 
There may be reprisals against them. 
Is this a recent thing? Has there been some particular build-up to 
occasion this larger scale movement? 
This has been going for quite a while. The Indonesian army 
patrols there in the area of the border. But this has built up since 
the OPM tried to take over Jayapura town and other areas. They 
made an attack on the government over there in a number of 
towns and districts. Then there was the incident of the 
kidnapping of the Swiss pilot when two Indonesians were killed. 
These incidents brought things to a head. That is when the 
people started to come across. Before that February incident in 
Jayapura town there were no refugees. 
Can you briefly describe what the refugees have told you of the 
February incident? 
I have heard there were attacks by the OPM on the army 
garrison, that they intended to knock out the power generator 
and take over the airstrip. I don't think this happened though 
they did manage to raise their West Papuan flag in Jayapura. But 
it seems the affair did not really come off as they intended. 
And what was the Swiss pilot incident? 
. He flew a mission plane (for the Jayapura Catholic Mission) 
with some cargo, and an Irianese teacher, into a place called 
Yurup. There is now no priest at that place but the teacher was 
intended to remain and be a church leader there. He also had an 
Indonesian doctor and a businessman with him. When they 
arrived I understand they were surrounded by the OPM and 
taken prisoner: the teacher, the Swiss pilot and the 2 
Indonesians. Then the OPM shot the 2 Indonesians. Shot them 
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with guns. They were walking away along the road in the bush. 
This is what I was told by the pilot. The pilot was in front, then 
the teacher and the 2 Indonesians at the back. As they were 
walking he heard 2 guns fire, he looked around and saw they had 
just shot the 2 Indonesians. 
What did they hope to achieve by this? Did they explain this to the 
pilot? 
It was hard to know exactly. At one stage they asked quite a 
large ransom: $1.5 million for the return of the Swiss pilot. But it 
seemed to me they were after recognition . They wanted to be 
recognised internationally as a cause , as a force, for what they 
were doing and they felt this was one way of getting that 
recognition. I'm pretty sure of that because one of the demands 
they made for his release was that the Swiss government would 
bring it up at the United Nations . Then they were told the Swiss 
government is not a member of the United Nations. 
Do you feel there is a danger to Papua New Guinea in this build-
up of troops at the border? 
There is a possibility that there could be a danger. 
Have you heard what numbers of troops there are? 
I've heard a couple of thousand, but I hear so many different 
things that I don't really know. I do know there has been &n 
increase of troops there. 
One of the accounts of the disquiet of the Melanesian people in 
lrian Jaya that we have heard is that their land is being taken by 
transmigrants who came from other parts of Indonesia, especially 
from Java. How much do the people you have spoken to claim 
that the transmigration is affecting them? Do they mention a 
shifting of population onto their land? 
Very little actually. It has not yet affected these people 
because I don't believe the transmigration has got this far. They 
know about it of course and they are concerned about it. People 
in Papua New Guinea near the border 'are also concerned 
because there is land on the other side of the border which 
traditionally belongs to people on this side. For a Melanesian, 
land is life. So there are people in Papua New Guinea who are 
really concerned about the transmigration . 
There is another argument that it is an Indonesian policy to scare 
people, move them from the land, and then move in and resettle a 
group of Javanese people so that there is a cordon of non-
Melanesians living along the border, thus protecting it. Do you 
think this is possibly so? 
It is a possibility. It is one way they could get rid of the 
OPM-by sealing the border. 
Since your help and concern has become known, what support 
have you received from around Papua New Guinea? 
I have received tremendous support financially, money to 
help the refugees; materially as with clothing people have sent; 
but moral support too that I received verbally and by letters, 
such as: "Thank the Lord you are doing something" . This is from 
the People of Papua New Guinea. But I have als" received 
support from Australia and other countries. 
Is there anything else you could ask of people here in Papua New 
Guinea, or elsewhere? Besides this support and patience? 
I'd have to think about that. 
Continued on page 20 
OPM report on atrocities in Merauke 
A report just received by T APOL from the 
Merauke District Command of the Free 
Papua Movement (OPM) describes at-
rocities committed by Indonesian para-
commandos in the Merauke sub-districts of 
Mindiptana and Waropka in May and June 
this year. As reported in the last issue of 
TAPOL Bulletin (No 64, July 1984), the 
Indonesian authorities have themselves ad-
mitted that well over half the population in 
the two sub-districts have fled, leaving 
their villages deserted. 5,032 people out of 
a population of 8,506 have left Mindiptana 
villages, and 4,358 have fled from villages 
in Waropka. (Sinar Harapan, 19 July, 
1984.) 
According to the OPM report, dated 23 
June, the OPM launched attacks on In-
donesian military posts at Sau village, 
Kauh-Digul sub-district on 3 May resulting 
in two casualties on the Indonesian side, 
and in Mindiptana resulting in two OPM 
guerrilla dead and one seriously wounded, 
with no losses for the Indonesians. A third 
attack followed in Waropka on 13 June. 
The atrocities which followed these inci-
dents are described by OPM as follows: 
* "Troops entered villages, destroyed 
homes in all the kampungs, and de-
stroyed the people's gardens, also kil-
ling livestock. Houses of the Catholic 
missions at Waropka and Ninati were 
sacked. Churches were attacked and 
fired at, inflicting heavy damage; all the 
church paraphernalia was thrown out 
and burnt, including bibles and 
rosaries." OPM claims that the Indone-
sian authorities then spread reports that 
these atrocities had been committed by 
the OPM. 
* When the inhabitants of the region of 
Muju fled their villages, about a 
hundred people were captured by In-
donesian troops. The captured people 
were locked in a rice storage shed, and 
kept inside for days without food or ac-
cess to sanitation. Many of the women 
inside including Catholic nuns were 
raped. At the time of writing the report, 
the OPM did not know anything about 
the fate of these people. 
* In June, 15 men were arrested by 12 In-
donesian soldiers in Kali Merauke reg-
ion and ordered to lead the troops to 
OPM hide-outs and to groups of villa-
gers making their way across the border 
to Papua New Guinea. The captured 
men and soldiers went in the direction 
of Bosset, near the border but found no 
one, so when they reached the bank of 
the Fly River on the border, fourteen of 
the fifteen men were shot dead, and the 
fifteenth man was orderd to behead the 
corpses. The heads were then carried 
away and buried elsewhere. 
The OPM report also claims that many 
villagers in the sub-districts of Tanah 
Merah, Kouh, Oksibil, Kiwirok and Ak-
misibil have been forced to flee across the 
border as a result of the escalation in OPM 
activities throughout the northern region 
of Merauke District. Many are believed to 
have crossed the border near Ok Tedi cop-
per-mine though others are thought to be 
roaming in the forests and mountains in 
West Papua. 
Although Catholic missions in the reg-
ion have, according to the OPM report, 
suffered severely at the hands of the milit-
ary, the church has refrained from making 
anything public to avoid creating further 
problems for missionaries working in the 
region . Mission stations in Muju sub-dis-
trict are now empty of priests, brothers and 
Taken at an OPM base in Merauke, earlier this year. 
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Arniy plans to re-locate the population of West Papua 
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*Diagram translated by TAPOL A plan for the re-settlement of the West Papuan population to locations that "can easily be guided and controlled so that the GPK (ie, the 
OPM) can be separated from the people" is set out in detail in a document issued in April 1984 by Brigadier-General Meliala Sembiring, 
Military Commander of the province of lrian Jaya. The document entitled "Basic Pattern of Territorial Management Specific to Irian Jaya 
by Means of Community Growth Centres" recently came into T APO L's hands. The above "Diagram of the Plan" is appended to the 
document. A comprehensive account of this document will be published in the forthcoming TAPOL Bulletin. 
New evidence about the murder of Arnold Ap 
Peter Hastings, the foreign editor of the Sydney Morning 
Herald, is now firmly convinced that Arnold Ap , the Jayapura 
Museum curator who was arrested last November, was killed by 
Kopassandha troops after they had deliberately plotted his 
"escape" from a prison in Jayapura. He bases his conviction on a 
letter recently sent to him by expatriates now worldng in West 
Papua . 
The letter confirms that Ap did make an escape attempt some 
time earlier in his detention and was re-captured. But the second 
"escape" was, writes Hastings, 
a put-up job by the . Kopassandha or red-berets, the paratroop 
formation, some of whose troops are in Irian Jaya . Some 
Kopassandha officers thought up a neat scheme whereby an alcoholic 
Irianese prison guard was offered a relatively huge sum to arrange for 
Ap's escape. From the moment it occurred, his every move down to 
the time he was cornered and killed, was carefully monitored. 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 27 August 1984.) 
Hastings prefaces his account by pointing out that the letter 
he received was signed by five foreigners, two of whom he knew 
personally. The letter also expressed support for Australian 
academics who have signed various protests againsHhe murder 
of Arnold A . 
Murdani bans Hastings 
Shortly after the appearance of this report , the Sydney Morning 
Herald announced that Peter Hastings has been banned 
indefinitely from entering Indonesia because of his reports on 
Ap's killing. The ban was issued on the personal instructions of 
General Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, after 
the first of Hastings' reports on the death of Arnold appeared in 
May 1984 (see TAPOL Bulletin No 63, May 1984). On 8 July, 
Hastings wrote a second report which gave the version of 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, claiming 
that Ap was killed in a shoot-out with Indonesian troops, as well 
as the version of Mulya Lubis , Director of the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Institute who was told in Jayapura that Ap had made a 
desperate bid to flee but had been shot down by troops four days 
later. The third Hastings ' account now confirms not only that he 
was shot down in cold blood but that the "escape" was a 
premeditated trick by Kopassandha officers. For Hastings to 
have put his name to such an account will not endear him to men 
like Murdani, and it could keep out a journalist whom the 
military regime have long regarded as one of their few friends 
among Australian journalists 
Arnold Ap (right) with a member of his Mambesak group. "Maybe you think what I am doing is stupid. But it is what I think I should do for 
my people before I die." (October 1982.) Taken from Zelfbeschikking, April-May-June, 1984. 
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East Timar 
UN again postpones discussion on East Timor 
The UN General Assembly's General (Agenda) Committee de-
cided on 20 September to postpone further discussion of East 
Timor until the 40th General Assembly meeting in 1985 . The 
proposal , submitted by Iceland, gave two reasons : the continu-
ing uncertainty about actual conditions inside East Timor , and 
the consultations still taking place under the terms of the 1982 
General Assembly resolution which instructed the UN Secretary 
General to conduct discussions with all parties directly con-
cerned. In the past few months , the UN has produced two 
documents rega'tding East Timor, both of which have been 
strongly criticised. 
The UN General Secretary's Progress Report (A/39/361, 25 
July 1984) gives an account of his contacts with representatives 
of the Indonesian and Portuguese governments in pursuance of 
UN General Assembly Resolution 37/30 adopted on 23 
November 1982, instructing the Secretary-General "to initiate 
consultations with all parties directly concerned with a view to 
exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of 
the problem" . 
UN consultations should include East Timor people. 
In a letter to UN Secretary-General Mr Perez de Cuellar, on 10 
August, Lord A vebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human 
Rights Group wrote: 
As it. stands, the report is essentially a log of contacts with 
representatives of the Indonesian government and the Portuguese 
government ... What I did not find in the report, however, was any 
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mention of consultations with the East Timorese themselves. There is 
no indication, for example, that any attempt was J!lade to CO?sult 
with the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East T1mor 
(FRETILIN) or any other Timorese parties . . . 
Would not the people of East Timor be considered as one of the 
"parties directly concerned?" And is a comprehensive settlement of 
the problem possible without the direct involvement of those most 
affected by any settlement, namely, the East Timorese? I submit that 
any negotiations that do not include representatives of the Timorese 
people will fail to produce a lasting solution to the East Timorese 
problem. 
Frankly, I do not think you will succeed unless you follow the dictates 
of common sense and Resolution 37/30, and include the East 
Timorese themselves on your agenda of consultations ... 
Bias in UN Working Paper attacked 
The other UN document prepared for this year's General 
Assembly is a Working Paper written by the Secretariat (A/ 
AC.109/783, 3 August 1984) for the Decolonisation Committee. 
This Working Paper was criticised by Roger Clark, Professor of 
Law at Rutgers School of Law, in a Petition made on behalf of 
the New York-based International League for Human Rights. 
He commends past documents from the UN Secretariat on East 
Timor, but expresses disappointment and concern with the tone 
and the selection of material for the present Report. "Too often, 
in our view, the Report gives undue emphasis to uncritically-
presented Indonesian propaganda handouts." The Petition 
points out that "while Indonesian 'statistics' are reproduced 
extensively and uncritically, the Report downplays information 
coming from other sources". The Report refers casually to the 
JUST OUT! 
The War Against East Timor analyses Indonesia's military and political 
strategy to subjugate and integrate East Timor since General Suharto's 
invasion of this former Portuguese colony in 1975. The authors, Carmel 
Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, present for the first time a comprehensive 
account of the current resurgence of Fretilin, which is the national libera-
tion movement of the people of East Tim or, following its earlier defeat in 
1977-78. 
. Nine secret Indonesian Army documents, captured by Fretilin guer-
rillas in December 1982, are here published in translation. They constitute 
an extraordinary manual of counter-insurgency operations, as well as 
demonstrating how real is Fretilin's renewed challenge to Indonesian 
annexation. 
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letter of 16 February 1984 from the Apostolic Administrator of 
Dili , Mgr Belo* whilst saying nothing of its contents. 
It is instructive to compare the way in which the Belo letter is glossed 
over in the Secretariat document with the prominent place given to it 
in a letter of 6 July 1984 from 123 members of the US House of 
Representatives to the US Secretary of State . That letter which 
represents a telling indictment of the current situation in the territory 
and urges the US government to insist that it be alleviated , gives 
strong emphasis to the views of what the Congressmen refer to as a 
"well-regarded clergyman" . What a different tone the Secretariat 
Report might have had if it had emphasised the words of the man of 
God rather than those of the governmental propaganda machine! 
More criticism of the Secretariat Working Paper was made in 
a statement to the Decolonisation Committee by Jose Ramos 
Horta, representing Fretilin . The following are excerpts from the 
Fretilin statement: 
In paragraph 11, the authors of "Working paper" went even 
further in what I would now call politically motivated bias . When 
they refer to the East Timorese freedom fighters, they called us 
"anti-Government guerrillas"! Not using quotation marks to 
clarify that such an expression was used by the Indonesian 
*Reproduced in full in TAPOL Bulletin No 63, March 1984. 
military, the authors of the "Working paper" seem to suggest 
that those resisting in East Timar are fighting against a legal 
government of that territory. 
Chapters V and VI deal with the "Food situation" and 
"Economic, Social and Educational Conditions" in East Timar. 
Anyone who reads these two chapters would be either impressed 
with the great things Indonesia has done in East Timar or would 
dismiss these claims as pure propaganda. What we cannot 
understand is how the authors of the so-called "Working paper" 
can be so daring in their pro-Indonesian bias to the point of 
reproducing in two full pages pure Indonesian propaganda. 
Indonesia , the aggressor responsible for the killing, famine and 
wanton destruction in East Timar, is presented as a generous 
benefactor of the East Timorese people. The authors of the 
"Working paper" used only two sources for the two chapters, V 
and VI : the Australian parliamentary delegation which visited 
East Timar in July of 1983 for no more than four days; and 
Indonesian government reports. The Australian parliamentary 
delegation was led by a certain Mr Morrison who is well-known 
for his pro-Indonesia and anti-East Timar views. Mr Morrison's 
report was completely discredited in Australia . The authors of 
the Secretariat chose to ignore other available information from 
more reliable sources that offer a different picture of the 
situation in East Timar. Continued on page 14 
Timorese will fight to the end, says former Bishop 
The following excerpts are taken from an interview of Mgr da Costa Lopes, former papal administrator or acting bishop of East 
Timar, by Ken Pottinger, in Newsweek, 3 September 1984. In an introduction, Pottinger describes Mgr da Costa Lopes as an 
"outstanding advocate of independence" for East Timar who was "recalled by the Vatican last year under pressure from Indonesia 's 
conservative Roman Catholic bishops". 
Do you think that Washington has a role to play in resolving the 
East Timor problem? Is it possible that the United States could 
put effective pressure on Indonesia? 
We have to distinguish between the views of the American 
people and those of the government. I believe that the people of 
the United States are sympathetic to the case of East Timar but 
the American government is compromised with Indonesia. As 
you know, [the then US secretary of state] Henry Kissinger was 
in Jakarta the day before Indonesia invaded, and made it clear 
that the United States was not opposed to the move. Washington 
has since provided much of the military equipment used by 
Indonesia in its fight against the resistance in East Timar. Still, 
America could make amends by persuading Jakarta to end the 
fighting in Timar and negotiate the territory's- independence. I 
am hopeful that with growing support in the US Congress and 
Senate, there will be a change in official American attitudes. 
What do you think of suggestions that East Timor should become 
an autonomous state associated with Indonesia but preserving its 
Portuguese cultural ties? 
I think the people of East Timar will firmly reject such an 
idea. They are determined to fight (for independence] to the 
end. They want to be independent at all costs. The proposal is 
ingenuous when you consider that 200,000 Timorese have lost 
their lives for independence. The people of East Timar know the 
Indonesians too well to want anything more to do with them . 
What is your assessment of current Portuguese and United 
Nations diplomatic efforts-or lack of them-aimed at solving the 
East Timor Problem? 
I think they are more hopeful since Secretary of State George 
Shultz met in July with (Indonesian Foreign Minister] 
Kusumaatmadja Mochtar. Portugal too is renewing efforts, but I 
don't think anything can be really achieved without first 
consulting the people of East Timar. There are three parties to 
this problem-Portugal, Indonesia and the Timorese people. I 
think the United Nations should try to persuade Indonesia to let 
the UN send a delegation into East Tim or. The UN should go 
into the mountains of Timar and talk to the people. I think such 
a move would be possible because last year during the cease-fire 
between Fretilin and Indonesian troops there were talks between 
the two sides in Tim or. 
Are you a supporter of Fretilin? 
I support Fretilin as a symbol of national resistance against 
Indonesia. I don't know if they are communist or not. But I 
believe that after so many years of illegal occupation by the 
Indonesian troops, the people of East Timar want nothing more 
to do with Indonesia because their experience has been so bad. 
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Continued from page 13 
This kind of approach to a "Working paper" raises questions 
of methodology and ethics and sets dangerous precedents. Should 
the Secretariat ignore the information supplied by the 
Representatives of the liberation movements and take at face-
value all the propaganda supplied by the colonial powers? The 
role of the Special Committee on Decolonisation is to bring 
about the speedy decolonisation of all colonial Territories. The 
Committee members are entitled to receive genuine, objective 
information expressing the views of the colonised peoples so as 
to enable the Committee to better discharge its functions. I do 
not think that it is the role of the Secretariat to reprint official 
propaganda put out by the colonial power. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
not been able to resume its humanitarian work in East Timor 
since July 1983. That I'm aware of, the ICRC has been able to 
make only two prison visitations in East Timor since July 1983: 
one in March 1984 and a second in June this year. These ICRC 
prison visitations are even more restricted than its activities prior 
to July 1983. It has been floated around the claim that ICRC has 
had uninterrupted activities in the Atauro island. This has been 
pres,..ented as a major concession by Indonesia. It hides the fact 
that Atauro is only a prison island and where ICRC presence is 
most needed is in the mainland where major military activities 
occur daily. The fact is that the Indonesian military authorities 
do not wish and do not allow the ICRC to be witness to its brutal 
war of aggression against the people of East Timor 
East Timar is the only case in the world where a major 
conflict is taking place with enormous human suffering and yet 
not one single international relief organisation is operating there. 
It is claimed that UNICEF is operating there. This is misleading 
because UNICEF's entire program is being handled by the 
Indonesian Red cross which is headed by a Brig.-General. 
Moreover, one of the most striking features of UNICEF/ 
Indonesian program there is to teach the Indonesian language to 
the East Timorese. In a letter to its Director General and in a 
statement before this Committee during its consideration of the 
East Timor question last year, I had the opportunity to express 
" . . the only case of a major conflict 
without a single international relief 
organisation operating." 
my outrage at UNICEF's involvement in spreading Indonesian 
language in East Timor. I repeat here again FRETILIN's firm 
objection to UNICEF and to any other international 
organisation working with the Indonesian Red Cross. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross is still 
prevented from resuming its activities in East Timor as provided 
for in the Geneva Conventions-relief assistance; prison 
visitations; protection of civilian populations. And all this should 
be carried out without restrictions of any sort. For more than a 
year now, we are told that negotiations are under way between 
the ICRC and the Indonesian authorities and that soon ICRC 
would resume its activities in East Timor. Yet, more than a year 
has elapsed and the people of East Timor are still without a 
single foreign doctor, without an ICRC presence. Someone is 
lying to us-the Indonesian authorities or the ICRC. The ICRC 
must share the blame and responsibility in this gross betrayal and 
deceit of the Geneva Conventions since it has not told us in no 
uncertain terms why it is not operating in East Timor. ICRC has 
allowed itself to be used by the Indonesian military authorities in 
misleading the rest of the world. 
Indonesian expansion is condemned 
Jose Ramos Horta's statement concludes with the following 
remarks on Indonesia's expansionist policies: 
Indonesia militaristic and expansionist policies are not 
directed only against East Timor. The situation in other parts of 
our region is becoming more and more volatile, ready to 
explode. Border violations, military incursions and attacks 
against a neighbouring· country, persecution of Melanesian 
" . . East Timor is the deterrence against 
further Indonesian expansionism. . . " 
people, monstrous transmigration schemes designed to replace 
one ethnic group by another-this is the explosive scenario in 
our region. Unless the international community takes the 
necessary actions to preempt an lndoneseian military adventure, 
the military men in Jakarta will push for military solutions to 
resolve their pressing economic, political and demographic 
problems. Today, East Timor is the only deterrence against 
further Indonesian expansionism because the Indonesian army is 
bogged down in a costly war there. The international community 
must therefore provide the people of East Timor all the moral, 
diplomatic and material support needed for our liberation. 
Jose Ramos Horta 
New Zealand Labour Party rejects military ties with Indonesia 
The New Zealand Labour Party annual conference, held only a 
couple of months after the Party was returned to power with a 
c?nvincing maj~rity, ?as call~d on t?e government to cut military 
atd and halt all mtelhgence !mks with Indonesia. The resolution 
also rejected such links with the Philippines, and said that the 
demand was made as a protest against political conditions in the 
two countrieti (Sinar Harapan, 11 September 1984). 
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Bishop of Dili calls for talks with Fretilin 
Mgr Carlos Filipe Belo , Bishop of Dili, was recently interviewed by Indonesian journalists in an attempt to refute interviews he gave 
recently to the foreign press. The following extracts are from Tempo, I September. 
What are your impressions after working three years as Bishop of 
Dili1 and travelling about in East Timor? 
Leninist ideology and don't want to accept the fact of integration. 
Would it not be a waste of time to talk with them? 
First of all, everything is by the grace of God. God works 
within the heart so that people can know His path. I have seen 
the pastors and the ordinary people working very hard in their 
respective regions . I have also seen that everyone in East Timor 
has joined the Catholic Church . They see things through the 
Church, they get protection . They feel that we are close to them . 
I don 't know whether they are really Marxists. I have not yet 
made any analysis about that. Some of them have asked to be 
baptised , for instance when there's a marriage. This year, 
though , there haven't been any requests of this nature. 
Do people feel there are difficulties now so that they ask the 
Church for protection? 
Would the negotiations you refer to take place within the context 
of East Timor being the 27th province of the Indonesian 
Republic? 
There aren't difficulties, but there are things lacking 
( kekurangan) . 
What things are lacking? 
People want the freedom to go to the market, to the rice 
fields , to the gardens and to the regions . If people living in the 
kecamatan-kecamatan (sub-district centres) were able to move 
around, their social and economic living conditions would be 
better. 
The reality is that the people of East Timor want peace . They 
want development. Self-determination as demanded by Fretilin 
is difficult. So, let's just think about building for the future of 
East Timor. To do this , the government will have to be able to 
win the hearts and minds of the people. 
1Mgr Belo, in fact , became the Bishop, or more correctly, the Apostolic 
Administrator of Dili , in May 1983. TAPOL 
But th~ government provides many facilities to help the people, 
doesn't it? 
Yes, the government provides facilities to help the people. 
But the important thing is that they should be able to feel that 
this development is for them, and in order for them to be able to 
enjoy it. People here want to live quiet lives. What they need is a 
quiet life. This is important . 
What steps do you think need to be taken now? 
I think there should be talks with Fretilin again . They need to 
talk with community leaders, with Church representatives, in 
order to create a tranquil situation. And I am willing to act as 
intermediary. 
But their leaders, such as Xanana Gusmao, adhere to Marxist-
Seniinarists write to MA WI president 
The following are extracts from a letter sent by students of the Seminary at Dare on the outskirts of Dili to the President of MAW I, the 
Indonesian Bishops Conference, who visited East Timar in January this year on the invitation of Mgr Belo, acting Bishop of Dili. There are 
21 students at the Seminary, taught by three priests and a brother. Seminary students return to their districts during their holidays and enjoy 
the confidentiality of the people, so can provide a link between people in outlying parts and the church in Dili. This letter was written soon 
after the students had returned to Dare from their Christmas break: 
Constant killings 
You, Bishop, will be able to see and hear 
for yourself what is the situation of East 
Tim or, especially in the trouble spots 
where constant killings occur. This can be 
seen by the increase in the number of In-
donesian military units with their heavy 
military arms, bomber planes, and tanks 
that are now spread into every corner . of 
East Timor. Apart from this almost on 
every occasion a misunderstanding will 
arise from among the Indonesian military 
who suspect people in urban areas of 
spreading unfounded rumours. This always 
brings with it news of suffering for many 
families. Such has happened in Lospalos, 
Viqueuque, Ainaro and Jumalai where 
young children are burnt in a fire or grab-
bed from their parents to be cut up like ani-
mals before their parents' eyes. And or-
phaned children are taken away at knife 
point. The military, perhaps because of the 
anger in their hearts, do not seem to have a 
sense of humanity in them. 
***** 
In this situation which is new to the 
people of this small island, parents are 
threatened with guns that there will be 
great hardships for the whole family unless 
they surrender their young, school-age 
daughters to be raped. There are also some 
women brought to courrnot to be tried, 
but because it provides an occasion to per-
form unholy acts upon them. 
Boys and men forced into battle 
One action that now critically threatens the 
people of Tim or, both in the city and in the 
mountains is the problem of the present 
military operation. For now they are taking 
boys and men aged 12 to 50 to join in the 
fighting - marched off into the forests 
without any weapons. In addition, they 
have to move ahead of the battle front with 
the military behind them. Why do ordinary 
citizens have to be forced into battle with-
out any weapons? 
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Missionaries being persecuted 
Finally about what is happening to the mis-
sionaries of this Diocese of Dili. Lately our 
missionaries in a number of parishes are 
pushed around aggressively and their pas-
toral work is being stopped by the army 
who suspect and accuse them of doing 
things to help Fretilin. But in fact all they 
are doing is in accordance with what can be 
found in the Bible. In this manner the army 
breaks into the houses of priests and 
searches through all that belongs to the 
parish. 
The letter asks the MA WI president to tell 
the Bishops , priests and Catholics of In-
donesia about the situation in East Timor 
and "to pray for us and where possible 
bring about a just and peaceful solution for 
the sake of humanity in East Timor". 
Taken from Asian Bureau Australia News-
letter, May 1984. 
15 
Timorese women reject birth 
control programme 
Lydia Moita, an East Timorese refugee in Lisbon, answered 
questions recently about birth control programmes in East Timor. 
The interview was conducted in writing by Mariet Peeters of the 
Women 's Group of the Dutch Indonesia Committee. 
Are traditional methods of contraception used in East Timor? 
Yes. They include turning of the uterus and the taking of 
herbs in liquid form or neat , or plants used for local application . 
But contraception has never been widely practised because 
Timorese families by tradition maintain a high birth rate . 
What are the contraceptives propagated by the Indonesians? 
They propagate the use of the pill, injections and 
contraceptive sheaths (condoms) as well as intra-uterine devices 
(IUD) . They also make use of surgical methods and X-ray. The 
method they propagate most vigorously is the Depo Provera 
injection. 
What kind of women respond to birth-control propaganda by the 
Indonesians? 
Only women of the upper classes. Among the Chinese , there 
are young, single women who accept sterilisation. 
Have there been cases of women being sterilised without their 
knowledge, for instance, during surgical operation? 
Yes. The majority of these cases occurred during the first five 
years after the Indonesian invasion . 
What means do the Indonesians use to propagate birth control 
under their family planning programme? 
They use television, the radio and posters in the streets, as 
well as groups of so-called "dynamisers" who go round 
encouraging people to practise birth control. 
Is pressure used, or do they try to entice women by offering gifts? 
Pressure isn't used openly, but Timorese people regard the 
birth control campaign as a method of reducing the Timorese to 
people living in reservations, like animals. 
Where and how are contraceptives distributed? 
They are distributed free of charge in maternity hospitals, by 
midwives and at birth control centres by groups of "dynamisers". 
There was an attempt to get men to accept sterilisation by means 
of X-ray but there was a lot of resistance to this. 
East Timar: 
What is the attitude of Timorese women to the birth control 
programme? 
They don 't accept it. Even before the invasion, very few 
people practised traditional methods of birth-control. And they 
don't like western methods because they say that pills and 
injections are for sick people and fertility is not a disease . In any 
case, the Timorese people defend their right to give birth to 
children to compensate for the many people who have died since 
the invasion . 
Resettlement villages to be 
fortified 
The Indonesian occupation forces in East Timor are cur-
rently engaged in building what are officially described as 
"guided villages as bases for resistance" (desa binaan 
pangkal perlawanan) throughout the country. Aswis-
warmo, the Secretary-General of the Department of the 
Interior, revealed this plan after a recent visit to East 
Timor. It is, he said, a "gigantic project" (proyek raksasa) 
as altogether 200 of these "guided villages" will have to be 
set up in order "to reinforce stability and security, and 
facilitate all aspects of development activity" . (Topik, 18 
July 1984.) 
This suggests that the military are reinforcing their 
counter-insurgency strategy by str,engthening the system of 
strategic villages known up till now in Indonesian parlance 
as daerah pemukiman (resettlement areas). This may 
mean re-locating some, if not all of the pemukiman as well 
as strengthening their perimeter fences . The new plan 
clearly affects all the present centres of Indonesian 
population control which have always been estimated to 
amount to between 150 and 200. 
The Topik report means that Indonesia's military 
operations since the August 1983 offensive was launched 
have confronted the continuing strength of Fretilin 
support networks right in the heart of the controlled 
population centres in Indonesian-held territory. (For a 
detailed discussion of this, see Budiardjo and Liem, The 
War Against East Timor, 1984, Zed Press, chapters 3 -4.) 
Unfinished Business 
How Fretilin recovered from near 
extinction . . . conditions under 
Indonesian occupation . . . cynical 
diplomacy. (Southeast Asia, 
Chronicle No. 94) 
An ideal outreach tool for organi-
zers an<;l teachers. 
Also available: But Timor: Beyond Ruger, 
an analysis of the famine of 1979-80. (Southeast Asia, Chronicle No. 74) 
$2.50 postpaid; 10 or more @$150 each plus 15% shipping. Payments in U.S. dollars only. 
Order from Southeast Asia Resource Center, P.O. Box 4000D, Berkeley, CA 94704, U.S.A. 
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Australia's seabed talks with Indonesia are illegal 
During a visit by Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, to 
Lisbon in early September, Australia was told that its 
negotiations with Indonesia on the seabed boundary between 
Australia and East Timor are illegal. The seabed talks have been 
imbued with a sense of urgency since the recent discovery of 
substantial oil deposits in the area (see "The 'Timar Gap': Oil 
and Trouble" in TAPOL Bulietin No 63, May 1984). Portugal is 
still the administering power in East Timar, Gama told Hayden, 
and Australia is in breach of international law by entering into 
negotiations with Indonesia. 
Just prior to the visit, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja accused Hayden of unwarranted interference by 
presuming to mediate between Indonesia and Portugal, while 
General Murdani publicly told Bill Hayden-yet again-to 
"mind your own business". These outbursts only reveal the 
jittery nature of Indonesia's responses to any international talks 
about East Timar. 
Portugal reiterates support for self-determination 
At a dinner for UN envoy, Rafeeudin Ahmed,* just prior to 
Hayden's visit, Portugal's Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama stated: 
"There will be no solution to the East Timar question if the 
necessary conditions are not created to give the people of East 
Timar the opportunity to exercise their right to self-
determination and protect their religious, language and cultural 
identity" (Diario de Noticias, and Sinar Harapan, 7 September). 
Hayden refused to say whether a similar view had been 
expressed to him during-his talks with Jaime Gama, but it has 
become clear since earlier this year that President Eanes has 
insisted on the Portuguese government upholding the principle 
of self-determination. While he does not exercise executive 
powers, the President is in a position to veto any Portuguese 
government move in another direction. 
Gama also told Hayden he believed his country would be in a 
stronger bargaining position with Indonesia when it gains entry 
into the European Economic Commission, probably in January 
1986. He said that the East Timar issue "was growing within the 
European Parliament and that once Portugal was a member of 
the EEC, the issue would be assessed differently" (The 
Australian, 10 September). 
But what of Hayden's views during his Lisbon visit? He has 
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Timorese into the consultations while at the same time attacking 
Fretilin as a "beleaguered" force. The Portuguese daily, Diario 
de Noticias even quoted Hayden as saying that no peace could be 
assured in East Timor as long as the people are denied their right 
to self-determination. But Jose Ramos Horta, who went to 
Lisbon to lobby on Fretilin's behalf before the Hayden visit, said 
he doubted whether Hayden has the interests of the East 
Timorese at heart. "His concern is to get rid of the issue" 
(Weekend Australian, 8-9 September) . Horta also said he had 
met presidential aides several times to discuss East Timar and 
had been assured that Portugal would stand by its commitment 
to East Timor's self-determination. 
*Appointed by the UN Secretary General to assist with consultations on 
East Timor. 
REVIEW 
BARNES (Robert), Whaling Off Lembata: The effects of a de-
velopment project on an Indonesian community, IWGIA Docu-
ment 48, IWGIA, Fiolstrade 10, DK-1171 Copenhagen K, May 
1984, 32pp, maps, pictures, bibliography. 
The development project described is that of the UN Food and 
Agriculture organisation undertaken in Lamalera on the island 
of Lambata (also called Lomblen) March 1973---November 
1975. 
Lembata has the only traditional sperm whaling industry in 
Southeast Asia, a means of livelihood mentioned in Portuguese 
documents as early as 1629. The main purpose of the project was 
to modernise this whaling tradition. The author describes the 
project in detail from its first initiative in 1969 until the end of 
1982. To begin with, the moving force behind the project was the 
Catholic mission. 
"The FAO project and its failures are still topics of discussion 
in Lamalera. The people feel that the technology was unsuited to 
their situation, and they express puzzlement about the aims of 
the programme. The benefits of the whaling they regard as 
having been only temporary." (p. 28). Above all, the people in 
Lamalera have been bitter about the whaling boat used in the 
project. This whaling boat was transferred to Larantuka where it 
still was in 1982. 
Finngeir Hiorth, Oslo 
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Death squads 
The killings continue 
The Indonesian press may not publish reports about death-squad killings which still continue. But reports like the following 
occasionally appear: 
Many people who have been branded 
"black-magic practitioners" are in fear of 
their lives in East Java. By the end of Au-
gust no fewer than 15 men branded in this 
way have turned up at the Jogjakarta Legal 
Aid Institute (LBH) asking for protection . 
Tempo (8 September) reports the de-
tails of one such fugitive named Abdul 
Gani whose house was broken into in the 
middle of the night, in the village of Curah 
Kalak, Situbondo district. Two masked 
men tried to drag him off but he managed 
to escape. Although he shouted for help, 
none of his neighbours dared to venture 
out because the whole village lived in fear 
following the disappearance of another vil-
lager, Nurhasim, whose body was disco-
vered on 4 August, full of wounds . Gani 
believes that the men who tried to capture 
him were also responsible for Nurhasim's 
death; at his funeral, Gani was warned that 
he was next on the list, and told that his life 
would be safe if he paid Rp 200,000 in pro-
tection money. 
Similar events have been reported to 
the LBH. from other parts of East Java. 
One group of masked men wearing army 
uniform who were questioned by the police 
about a killing, claimed that the man they 
murdered had been a black-magic prac-
titioner. In West Java too, reports Tempo, 
there have been many killings for the same 
reason. Fifty victims were killed in the year 
up to last June in the district of Tasik-
malaya , of whom 22 were from one sub-
district alone , the sub-district of Cikalong. 
All, writes Tempo, were people acknow-
ledged locally as community leaders . 
When LBH lawyers visited the army 
command in Situbondo recently to seek as-
surances that such incidents would stop, all 
they were told by the commander was that 
people regarded as black-magicians were 
indeed now being listed, "not in order to 
be bumped off but to be given guidance", 
the officer said . 
Five extra years for using Marxist expres-
sions in court 
A man being tried for murder at the district 
court in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, was 
given an extra heavy sentence because he 
used what the judge called "Marxist ter-
minology" in his defence plea. The pro-
secutor in the trial of Siswanto had asked 
the court to pass down a sentence of ten 
years, but after hearing words like 
"materialism" and "dialectics" in Sis-
wanto's statement to the court, the judges 
took strong exception to the "communist 
flavour" of his defence and decided that a 
far heavier sentence was warranted. In ad-
dition, since the court was led to believe 
that Siswanto's defence plea had been writ-
ten with the assistance of Siswanto's co-
prisoners, the public prosecutor's office 
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The family of Nurhasim, killed in August by a death squad. 
has now asked the East Kalimantan milit-
ary command to carry out investigations at 
the prison to discover how such a thing 
could have happened. 
But the Siswanto trial merits attention 
for another reason. The defendant made 
no secret of the fact that he murdered a 
man named Soetrisno because he was 
known to be a "recidivist". Siswanto told 
the court that he had committed the crime 
as part of the campaign to fight crime. "I 
did not do it for personal reasons but to 
help establish law and order and in re-
Siswanto in court. 
sponse to the government's appeal to the 
people to help fight crime". He told the 
court he considered that he should be 
treated as a hero, not punished, for re-
sponding to the government's appeal. The 
flaw in Siswanto's otherwise impeccable 
logic is that he is not a member of the 
Armed Forces, so killing "known crimi-
nals" becomes a crime, not a deed to 
safeguard security. 
Source: Tempo, 15 September 1984. 
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Indonesia's troubled image 
A Sinar Harapan journalist in London , 
Suharjono, has recently expressed deep an-
xiety about criticism of Indonesia in the 
British press (Sinar Harapan, 1 September 
1984). When he arrived in London not long 
ago, he was apparently shocked to find not 
only uncensored reports in the mainstream 
press but even to discover that books 
harshly critical of the military regime Were 
being published and sold here . 
In a tale of woes several columns long 
he accused papers like the Times, the Daily 
Telegraph and the Financial Times of writ-
ing "pure sensation", basing themselves on 
such unreliable sources as Reuters and 
AFP. Nor was he at all happy about the 
BBC World Service which was hell-.bent on 
giving incorrect (i.e. unofficial) accounts of 
what goes on in West Papua and East 
Timor. The AFP's interview of the Bishop 
of Dili , to take one example , was simply a 
piece of anti-Indonesian propaganda be-
cause the Bishop had found not a single 
nice thing to say about Indonesian rule in 
East Timor. 
Suharjono then turned his wrath ·on 
TAPOL which is now more vicious than 
ever in the attacks and insults it heaps on 
the Indonesian regime; worse still, it has 
the nerve to send its dangerous publica-
tions freely to people in Indonesia . He 
listed the book titles T APOL is now pub-
lishing and selling (and even translated 
them into Indonesian), though no. doubt 
his intention was not to encourage SH 
readers to write for copies of such subver-
sive literature . 
Finally, the journalist complained bit-
terly of the "do-nothing" attitude of the In-
donesian embassy who reserve their bouts 
of frenzied activity for occasional visits of 
high officials from Jakarta or national day 
celebrations. This was a remark that could 
not go unchallenged. Two days later, Ira-
wan Abidin, former information officer at 
the London embassy, was defending him-
self vigorously ·in the columns of Sinar 
Harapan (3 September). Had he not spo-
ken to the editor of the Guardian and a 
journalist in the Times and managed to get 
"long articles" in to refute baseless reports 
which they had published in their ignor-
ance? Had he not even put a stop to the 
·publication of articles by Carmel Budiardjo 
in the journal of the · Iranian Embassy? 
(Not that she has ever written for that pub-
lication , mind you. Mr Abidin should have 
tackled the problem at source, for the 
Muslimedia agency is still · quite happy to 
publish her writings.) 
Then, said the unfortunate Mr Abidin , 
there was the occasion when he went to 
,Scotland where he was "attacked" by Am-
nesty international. Here too, we can fill in 
the details . His venture up north to .address 
the Bali Society at St Andrews University 
turned out to be a rowdy occasion, for stu-
Britain • ID 
dents there had read his rejoinder (all 28 
lines of it) in the Guardian to the 
Budiardjo article on West Papua and had 
come to the conclusion that here was man 
who needed to be challenged. Later Mr 
Abidin pleaded by letter with the St An-
drews University Students Union to discip-
line the student who wrote an "offensive" 
article about Indonesia in the Union jour-
nal. But even if they had understood his 
convoluted reasoning and rather odd En-
glish , they were hardly likely to bow to the 
kind of interference Indonesian editors 
have to put up with . 
As for T APOL, we can only thank 
Suharjono for giving us so much publicity 
right 'where we'd like it most , in Indonesia . 
The tight-rope existence of the Indonesian preSs as depicte(I in a Sinar Harapan cartoon, 
11 February 1984. No wonder the editors decided not to publish a letter from TAPOL 
responding to Irawan Abidin's explanations. 
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Water will erode the stones 
The poet and playwright Rendra, a central figure of Indonesian cultural life, has been prevented sin~e 1978 from appe~ring in 
public to read his poems or have his plays produced. The following poem, translated by Max Lane is an example of his recent 
writings and is taken from Inside Indonesia, Australia, No 2, May 1984. 
Poem of an angry person 
Because we eat roots 
And flour piles up in your warehouses . .. 
Because we live all cramped up 
And your space is so abundant . .. 
So we are not allies. 
Because we are soiled 
And you are shiny bright . . . 
Because we feel suffocated 
And you lock the door . . . 
So we distrust you. 
Because we are abandoned on the streets 
And you own all the shade . .. 
Because we endure floods 
And you party on pleasure boats . .. 
So we don't lik e you. 
Because we are silenced 
And you never stop nagging . .. 
Because we are threatened 
And you use violence against us . .. 
So we say to you NO. 
Continued from page 9 
May I ask you an even harder question? Will these refugees ever 
go back, and if so, when? 
That is a hard question! I hope and pray that those who would 
be at risk when they go back will be given political asylum. There 
are quite a number among these refugees who I feel should be 
given political asylum. There are others particularly out in the 
bush areas who do not want to leave their ground and village. I 
think they , eventually, should be allowed just to go back to their 
villages. But when? The people in the bush say when it is safe for 
them to go back . But I hope they won't be sent back before it is 
time. 
Do you think it is justified that this be kept as an internal matter 
between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia? Or do you feel that 
deeper involvement of the United Nations in interviewing, 
Because we may not choose 
And you are free to.make plans . .. 
Because we have only sandals 
And you are free to use rifles . . . 
Because we must be polite 
And you have jails . .. 
So NO and NO to you. 
Because we are the current of the river 
And you are the stones without heart . .. 
So the water will erode away the stones. 
processing and assistance is warranted? 
I do. I think it is beyond an internal matter between two 
countries now because quite a number are refugees. They are 
fleeing something to come here. They are asking for refuge. I 
would very much like to see the United Nations involved. It is 
too much for the mission and it is too much for the government 
to look after them, but the United Nations can do it. And ihhere 
is to be any repatriation, I would like to see the United Nations 
involved in that. 
If there are attempts to forcibly repatriate people, what will you 
do? 
If there are people whom I believe, from my close knowledge 
of the situation, are genuine refugees, and if there are attempts 
to forcibly return them, then I will state my objection very 
strongly and very publicly. 
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